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Summary findings
When average incomes rise, the average incomes of the  have little systematic effect on the share of income that
poorest fifth of society rise proportionately.  This is a  accrues to the bottom  quintile. Consequently, these
consequence of the strong empirical regularity that the  factors benefit the poorest fifth of society as much as
share of income accruing to the bottom quintile does not  everyone else. There is some weak evidence that
vary systematically with average income. Dollar and  stabilization from high inflation and reductions in the
Kraay document this empirical regularity in a sample of  overall size of government not only increase growth but
92 countries spanning the past four decades and show  also increase the income share of the poorest  fifth in
that it holds across regions, periods, income levels, and  society. Finally, Dollar and Kraay examine several factors
growth rates.  commonly thought to disproportionately  benefit the
Dollar and Kraay next ask whether the factors that  poorest in society, but find little evidence of their effects.
explain cross-country differences in the growth rates of  The absence of robust findings emphasizes that relatively
average incomes have differential effects on the poorest  little is known about the broad forces that account for
fifth of society. They find that several determinants of  the cross-country and intertemporal variation in the
growth-such  as good rule of law, openness to  share of income accruing to the poorest  fifth of society.
international trade, and developed financial markets-
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1. Introduction
The world  economy  has grown  well during  the 1  990s,  despite  the financial  crisis
in East  Asia. However,  there  is intense  debate  over  the extent  to which  the poor benefit
from this growth. The  two quotes  above  exemplify  the extremes  in this debate. At one
end of the spectrum  are  those  who argue  that the potential  benefits  of economic  growth
for the poor are undermined  or even offset  entirely  by sharp increases  in inequality  that
accompany  growth. At the other  end of the spectrum  is the argument  that liberal
economic  policies  such as monetary  and fiscal stability  and open markets  raise incomes
of the poor and everyone  else in society  proportionately.
In light of the heated  popular  debate  over  this issue,  as well as its obvious  policy
relevance,  it is surprising  how liKtle  systematic  cross-country  empirical  evidence  is
available  on the extent  to which  the poorest  in society  benefit  from economic  growth.  In
this paper,  we define  the poor as those in the boftom  fifth of the income  distribution  of a
country,  and empirically  examine  the relationship  between  growth  in average  incomes  of
the poor and growth  in overall  incomes,  using  a large  sample  of developed  and
developing  countries  spanning  the last four decades. Since  average  incomes  of the
poor are proportional  to the share of income  accruing  to the poorest  quintile  times
average  income,  this approach  is equivalent  to studying  how a particular  measure  of
income  inequality  -- the first quintile  share  - varies  with average  incomes.
We find that incomes  of the poor rise proportionately  with average  incomes.
Figure 1 illustrates  this basic point. In the top panel,  we plot the logarithm  of per capita
incomes  of the poor (on the vertical  axis)  against  the logarithm  of average  per capita
1incomes  (on  the horizontal  axis),  pooling  418 country-year  observations  on these  two
variables. The sample  consists  of 137 countries  with at least  one observation  on the
share of income  accruing  to the bottom  quintile,  and  the median  number  of observations
per country  is 3. There  is a strong,  positive,  linear  relationship  between  the two
variables,  with a slope  of 1.07.  Since both  variables  are measured  in logarithms,  this
indicates  that on average  incomes  of the poor rise  equi-proportionately  with average
incomes. In the bottom  panel  we plot average  annual  growth in incomes  of the poor (on
the vertical  axis) against  average  annual  growth  in average  incomes  (on the horizontal
axis), pooling  285 country-year  observations  where  we have  at least  two observations
per country  on incomes  of the poor separated  by at least  five years. The sample
consists  of 92 countries  and the median  number  of growth  episodes  per country  is 3.
Again, there  is a strong,  positive,  linear  relationship  between  these  two variables  with a
slope  of 1.19. In the majority  of the formal  statistical  tests  that follow, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis  that the slope of this relationship  is equal  to one. This indicates  that
on average,  within countries,  incomes  of the poor rise  equi-proportionately  with average
incomes. This is equivalent  to the observation  that there  is no systematic  relationship
between  average  incomes  and the share of income  accruing  to the poorest  fifth of the
income  distribution. Below  we examine  this basic  finding  in more detail  and find that it
holds  across  regions,  time periods,  growth  rates and income  levels, and is robust  to
controlling  for possible  reverse  causation  from incomes  of the poor to average  incomes.
Given  the strong  relationship  between  incomes  of the poor and average  incomes,
we next ask whether  policies  and institutions  that raise average  incomes  have
systematic  effects  on the share of income  accruing  to the poorest  quintile  which might
magnify  or offset  their  effects  on incomes  of the poor. We focus  attention  on a set of
policies  and institutions  whose importance  for average  incomes  has been  identified  in
the large  cross-country  empirical  literature  on economic  growth. These include
openness  to intemational  trade,  macroeconomic  stability,  moderate  size of government,
financial  development,  and strong  property  rights  and rule of law. We find little  evidence
that these  policies  and institutions  have  systematic  effects  on the share of income
accruing  to the poorest  quintile. The only exceptions  are that there is some  weak
evidence  that smaller  government  size and stabilization  from high inflation
disproportionately  benefit  the poor by raising  the share of income  accruing  to the bottom
quintile. These  findings  indicate  that growth-enhancing  policies  and institutions  tend to
2benefit  the poor and everyone  else in society  proportionately.  We also show that the
distributional  effects  of such  variables  tend to be small relative  to their effects  on overall
economic  growth.
We next  examine  in more  detail  the popular  idea  that greater  economic
integration  across  countries  is associated  with increases  in inequality  within countries.
We first consider  a range  of measures  of international  openness,  including  tariffs,
membership  in the World  Trade Organization,  and  the presence  of capital controls,  and
ask whether  any  of these has systematic  effects  on  the share  of income  accruing  to the
poorest  in society. We find little  evidence  that they do so, and we find that this result
holds  even when we allow  the effects  of measures  of openness  to depend  on the level of
development  and differences  in factor endowments  as predicted  by the factor
proportions  theory  of international  trade. We conclude  from this that, on average,
greater  economic  integration  benefits  the poorest  in society  as much  as everyone  else.
In recent  years  there has  been a great  deal of emphasis  in the development
community  on making  growth  even more  "pro-poor."  Given  our evidence  that neither
growth nor growth-enhancing  policies  tend  to be systematically  associated  with changes
in the share of income  accruing  to the poorest  fifth  of societies,  we interpret  this
emphasis  on "pro-poor"  growth  as a call for some  other  policy  interventions  that raise  the
share of income  captured  by  the poorest  in society. We empirically  examine  the
importance  of four such  factors in determining  the income  share  of the poorest: primary
educational  attainment,  public  spending  on health  and education,  labor productivity  in
agriculture  relative  to the rest of the economy,  and  formal  democratic  institutions. While
it is plausible  that these  factors are important  in bettering  the lot of poor people  in some
countries  and under  some  circumstances,  we are unable  to uncover  any systematic
evidence  that they raise  the share of income  of the poorest  in our large cross-country
sample.
Our work builds  on and contributes  to two strands  of the literature  on inequality
and growth. Our basic  finding  that (changes  in) income  and (changes  in) inequality  are
unrelated  is consistent  with  the findings  of several  previous  authors  including  Deininger
and Squire  (1996),  Chen  and Ravallion  (1997),  and Easterly  (1999)  who document  this
same regularity  in smaller  samples  of countries. We build  on this literature  by
3considering  a significantly  larger  sample  of countries  and by employing  more  elaborate
econometric  techniques  that take into  account  the possibility  that income  levels  are
endogenous  to inequality  as suggested  by a variety  of growth  models.  Our results  are
also related  to the small  but growing  literature  on  the determinants  of the cross-country
and intertemporal  variation  in measures  of income  inequality,  including  Li, Squire and
Zou (1998),  Gallup,  Radelet  and Warner  (1998),  Barro  (1999),  Spilimbergo  et. al. (1999),
Leamer  et. al. (1999),  and Lundberg  and Squire  (2000)  . Our work expands  on this
literature  by considering  a wider range  of potential  determinants  of inequality  using  a
consistent  methodology  in a large  sample  of countries,  and can be viewed  as a test of
the robustness  of these  earlier  results  obtained  in smaller  and possibly  less
representative  samples  of countries. We discuss  how our  findings  relate  to those of
these  other  papers  throughout  the discussion  below.
The rest of this paper proceeds  as  follows. In the next section  we provide  a brief
non-technical  overview  of the results. Section  3 describes  the data and empirical
specification.  Section  4 is presents  our main  findings. Section  5 concludes.
42. The Story in Pictures
Income  of the poor has  a very tight link with  overall  incomes. The top panel  of
Figure 1 shows  the logarithm  of average  income  in the poorest  fifth of the population
plotted against  the logarithm  of average  income  for the whole  economy  (per  capita
GDP). The graph includes  418 observations  covering  137  countries,  and multiple
observations  for a single  country  are separated  by at least  five years  over time. The
slope of this relationship  is very  close to one,  and all of the observations  are closely
clustered  around  this regression  line. This indicates  that as overall  income  increases,  on
average  incomes  of the poor increase  equiproportionately.  For 285 of these
observations,  we can relate growth  of income  of the poor over  a period  of at least  five
years  to overall  economic  growth,  as shown  in the bottom  panel  of Figure 1. Again,  the
slope of the relationship  is slightly  larger  than  one, and although  the fit is not quite as
tight as before,  it is still impressive.' There  are 149 episodes  in which  per capita  GDP
grew at a rate of at least  2% per  year: in 131  of these  episodes,  income  of the poor also
rose. Thus, it is almost  always  the case  that the income  of the poor rises  during  periods
of significant  growth. There are a variety  of econometric  problems  with simple  estimates
of the relationship  between  incomes  of the poor and overall  income,  which  we take up in
the following  section. Even  after addressing  these,  the basic  result  that growth in the
overall  economy  is reflected  one-for-one  in growth  in income  of the poor  turns out  to be
very robust.
One can use  the data  in Figure  1 to ask a closely-related  question: what  fraction
of the variation  across  countries  and over  time in (growth  in) incomes  of the poor can be
explained  by (growth  in) overall  income? In terms  of levels  of per capita  income,  this
fraction  is very large. The data  in the top panel  of Figure 1 imply that over  80 percent  of
the variation  in incomes  of the poor is due to variation  in overall  per capita incomes,  and
only 20 percent  is due to differences  in income  distribution  over  time and/or across
countries. To us, this reflects  nothing  more  than  the commonsense  observation  that
poor people  in a middle-income  country  like Korea  enjoy  much  higher  living  standards
than poor people  in a country  like India,  not because  they receive  a significantly  larger
share of national  income,  but simply  because  average  incomes  are much  higher  in
5Korea than in India. So far, this discussion  has  focused  on cross-country  differences  in
income  levels,  which reflect  growth  over  the very long run. Over shorter  horizons  such
as those  captured  in the bottom  panel  of Figure  1, growth in average  incomes  still
explains  a substantial  fraction  of growth  in average  incomes: just under  half of the
growth of incomes  of the poor is explained  by growth  in mean income. 2
Having  seen the importance  of growth  in overall  income  for incomes  of the poor,
we tum to the remaining  variation  around  the general  relationship  in Figure 1. The main
point of this paper is to try to uncover  systematic  pattems  in those  deviations  - that is,
what makes  growth especially  pro-poor  or pro-rich?  We consider  two types  of
hypotheses. First,  we consider  hypotheses  that essentially  involve  dividing  the data
points  into different  groups  (poor  countries  versus  rich countries,  crisis periods  versus
normal  growth,  and the recent  period  compared  to earlier  times). Second,  we introduce
other  institutions  and policies  into  the analysis  and ask whether  these influence  the
extent  to which  growth benefits  the poor.
A common  idea in the development  literature  is the "Kuznets  hypothesis"  that
inequality  tends  to increase  during  the early stages  of development  and then decrease
later  on. In our framework,  exploring  this hypothesis  requires  that, in trying  to explain
growth  of income  of the poor,  we need  to interact  growth  of per  capita income  with the
initial  level of income. We find this interaction  term to be zero. In other  words,  in our
large sample  of countries  and years,  there is no apparent  tendency  for growth to be
biased  against  low-income  households  at early stages  of development.
Another popular  idea is that crises  are particularly  hard on  the poor. Our growth
episodes  are  all at least  five years  long. Hence,  an episode  of negative  per capita  GDP
growth  in our sample  is a period  of at least  five years  in which per capita incomes  fell on
average:  we feel comfortable  labeling  these as 'crisis" periods. We introduce  a dummy
variable  to investigate  whether  the relationship  between  growth  of income  of the poor
2 The  figures  in this  paragraph  are based  on the following  standard  variance  decomposition.  The  logarithm
of per capita  income  of the poor  is equal  to the logarithm  of the share  of income  accruing  to the bottom
quintile,  plus  the logarithm  of overall  per capita  income,  plus  a constant. Given  an observation  on per capita
income  of the poor  that is x0 /o  above  the mean,  we would  expect  that 80%  of this deviation  is due  to higher
per  capita  income,  and  only 20%  due to lower  inequality.  The  figure  80% is  the covariance  between  per
capita  income  and incomes  of  the poor  divided  by the variance  of incomes  of the poor. The  calculation  for
growth  rates  is analogous.
6and overall  growth  is different  during  crisis periods. We find  no evidence  that crises
affect  the income  of the poor disproportionately.  Of course,  it could  still be the case  that
the same  proportional  decline  in income  has  a greater  impact  on the poor if social safety
nets are weak,  and so crises  may  well be harder  on the poor. But this is not because
their incomes  tend to fall more  than those  of other  segments  of society. A good
illustration  of this general  observation  is the recent  financial  crisis in East  Asia in 1997.
In Indonesia,  the income  share of the poorest  quintile  actually  increased  slightly  between
1996  and 1999,  from 8.0%  to 9.0%, and in Thailand  from 6.1 percent  to 6.4 percent
between  1996  and 1998,  while  in Korea it remained  essentially  unchanged  after the
crisis relative  to before.
A third idea is that growth  used  to benefit  the poor,  but that the relationship  is no
longer  so robust. We test this by allowing  the relationship  between  income  of the poor
and overall  income  to vary by decades. We find no significant  evidence  that growth  has
become  less pro-poor  than it was in the past. In fact, our point estimates  indicate  that, if
anything,  growth has become  slightly  more pro-poor  in recent  decades,  although  this
trend is not statistically  significant. In summary,  none  of the efforts  to distinguish  among
the poverty-growth  experiences  based  on level  of development,  time period,  or crisis
situation  changes  the basic proportional  relationship  between  incomes  of the poor and
average  incomes.
We next  turn to the second  set of hypotheses  concerning  the role of various
institutions  and policies  in explaining  deviations  from  this basic relationship  between
incomes  of the poor and growth. A core set of institutions  and policies  (notably,
macroeconomic  stability,  fiscal  discipline,  openness  to trade,  financial sector
development,  and rule of law) have been  identified  as pro-growth  in the vast empirical
growth literature. However,  it is possible  that these  policies  have a systematically
different  impact  on income  of the poor. For example,  the popular  idea  that
"globalization"  increases  inequality  within  countries  - as expressed  in the opening  quote
from Jay Mazur  - can be examined  by asking  whether  measures  of openness  can help
explain  negative  deviations  in  the relationship  between  income  of the poor and mean
income. Alternatively,  there  may be institutions  and policies  that have not been
established  as robust  determinants  of growth,  but are often  thought  to be good  for the
poor,  notably  democracy  and social spending. These  hypotheses  can be considered  by
7asking  whether  these  variables  explain positive  deviations  in the relationship  between
income  of the poor and mean  income.
We use Figure  3 to summarize  the results  of introducing  these policies  and
institutions  into  the analysis. We decompose  the effects  of each of these  variables  on
mean incomes  of the poor into two components.  The first, labeled  "growth  effect",
shows direct  effects  of the indicated  variable  on incomes  of the poor that operates
through  its effect  on overall  incomes. The second,  labeled  'distribution effect"  captures
the indirect  effect of that variable  on incomes  of the poor through  its effects  on the
distribution  of income. Openness  to international  trade  raises  incomes  of the poor by
raising  overall  incomes. The effect  on the distribution  of income  is tiny and not
significantly  different  from zero. The same  is true  for improved  rule of law and financial
development,  which raise overall  per capita  GDP but do not significantly  influence  the
distribution  of income.  Reducing  government  consumption  and stabilizing  inflation  are
examples  of policies  that are "super-pro-poor".  Not only do both  of these raise overall
incomes,  but they appear  to have  an additional  positive  effect  on the distribution  of
income,  further  increasing  incomes  of the poor. In the case  of reducing  government
consumption,  this additional  distributional  effect is statistically  significant  in some  of our
specifications,  and the pro-poor  effect of reducing  high  inflation  is also close  to
significant. 3 From  this we conclude  that the basic  policy  package  of private property
rights,  fiscal discipline,  macro  stability,  and openness  to trade  increases  the income  of
the poor to the same  extent  that it increases  the income  of the other households  in
society. This is not some  process  of "trickle-down,"  which  suggests  a sequencing  in
which the rich  get richer  first and  eventually  benefits  trickle  down  to the poor. The
evidence,  to the contrary,  is that private  property  rights,  stability,  and openness  directly
and contemporaneously  create  a good  environment  for poor households  to increase
their production  and income.
Finally,  we also examine  a number  of institutions  and policies  for which  the evidence
of their growth  impacts  is less  robust,  but which  may have  an impact  on the material
well-being  of the poor. Most notable  among  these are  government  social  spending,
8formal democratic  institutions,  primary  school  enrollment  rates,  and agricultural
productivity  (which  may  reflect  the benefits  of public  investment  in rural areas). None  of
these  variables  has any robust  relationship  to either growth  or to income  share of the
poor. Social  spending  as a share  of total spending  has  a negative  relationship  to
income  share of the poor that is close  to statistical  significance.  That finding  reminds  us
that public  social  spending  is not necessarily  well targeted  to the poor. 4 The simple
correlations  between  all of these  variables  and income  share of the poor,  in both  levels
and differences,  are shown  in Figures  2, 4, and 5. Those  simple  correlations  reflect
what  we find in multivariate  analysis:  it is not easy  to find any robust  relationships
between  institutions  and policies,  on the one hand,  and income  share  of the poor,  on
the other.
To summarize,  we find that contrary  to popular  myths,  standard  pro-growth
macroeconomic  policies  are good  for the poor  as they raise  mean incomes  with no
systematic  adverse  effect  on the distribution  of income. In fact, there is weak evidence
that macro  stability,  proxied  by stabilization  from high  inflation  and a reduction  in
government  consumption,  increases  income  of the poor more  than mean  income  as
they tend to increase  the income  share  of the poorest. Other policies  such as good rule
of law,  financial  development,  and openness  to trade  benefit  the poor and the rest of the
economy  equally. On the other  hand,  we find no evidence  that formal  democratic
institutions  or a large  degree  of government  spending  on social  services  generally  affect
income  of the poor. Finally,  the growth-poverty  relationship  has not changed  over  time,
does not vary during  crises,  and is generally  the same  in rich countries  and poor ones.
In the remainder  of this paper  we provide  details  on how  these results  are  obtained.
This is not to say that growth  is all that is needed  to improve  the lives of the poor.
Rather,  we simply  emphasize  that growth  generally  does benefit  the poor as much  as
3This  result  is  consistent  with existing  evidence  in smaller  samples. Agenor  (1998)  finds an adverse  effect
of inflation  on the poverty  rate,  using  a cross-section  of 38 countries. Easterly  and Fischer  (2000)  show  that
the  poor  are  more  likely  to rate  inflation  as  a top  national  concem,  using  survey  data  on  31869  households
in 38 countries. Datt  and Ravallion  (1999)  find evidence  that inflation  is  a significant  determinant  of poverty
using  data  for Indian  states.
9anyone  else in society,  and so the growth-enhancing  policies  of good rule of law,  fiscal
discipline,  and openness  to international  trade  should  be at the center  of any effective
poverty  reduction  strategy.
4 Existing  evidence  on the effects  of social  spending  is mixed. Bidani  and  Ravallion  (1997)  do find a
statistically  significant  impact  of health  expenditures  on the poor  (defined  in absolute  terms as  the share  of
the population  with income  below  one  dollar  per  day)  in a cross-section  of 35 developing  countries,  using a
different  methodology.  Gouyette  and Pestiau  (1999)  find a simple  bivariate  association  between  income
inequality  and social  spending  in a set  of 13 OECD  economies.  In contrast  Filmer  and Pritchett  (1997)  find
little  relationship  between  public  health  spending  and  health  outcomes  such as infant  mortality,  raising
questions  about  whether  such  spending  benefits  the poor.
103. Empirical  Strategy
3.1 Measuring Income and Income of the Poor
We measure  mean  income  as real per  capita  GDP at purchasing  power  panty  in
1985  intemational  dollars, based  on an extended  version  of the Summers-Heston  Penn
World Tables  Version  5.6.5 In general,  this need  not be  equal  to the mean level  of
household  income,  due to a variety  of reasons  ranging  from simple  measurement  error
to retained  corporate  eamings. We nevertheless  rely on per capita  GDP for two
pragmatic  reasons. First,  for many  of the country-year  observations  for which we have
information  on income  distribution,  we do not have  corresponding  information  on mean
income  from the same  source. Second,  using per  capita  GDP helps us to compare  our
results  with  the large literature  on income  distribution  and growth  that typically  follows
the same  practice. In the absence  of evidence  of a systematic  correlation  between  the
discrepancies  between  per capita  GDP and household  income  on the one hand,  and per
capita GDP on the other,  we treat these  differences  as classical  measurement  error,  as
discussed  further below.6
5We begin  with  the Summers  and Heston  Penn  World  Tables  Version  5.6, which  reports  data  on real per
capita  GDP adjusted  for differences  in purchasing  power  parity  through  1992  for most  of the 156  countries
included  in that dataset. We use the growth  rates  of constant  price  local  currency  per  capita  GDP  from the
World Bank  to extend  these  forward  through  1997. For  a further  set  of 29 mostly  transitfon  economies  not
included  in the Penn  World  Tables  we have  data  on constant  price  GDP  in local  currency  units. For  these
countries  we obtain  an estimate  of PPP  exchange  rate  from  the fitted  values  of a regression  of PPP
exchange  rates  on the logarithm  of GDP  per capita  at PPP. We use  these  to obtain  a benchmark  PPP GDP
figure  for 1990,  and  then use growth  rates  of constant  price  local  currency  GDP  to extend  forward  and
backward  from this  benchmark.  While  these  extrapolations  are necessarily  crude,  they do not matter  much
for our results. As discussed  below, the statistical  identification  in the paper  is based  primarily  on within-
country  changes  in incomes  and  incomes  of the poor,  which  are unaffected  by adjustments  to the levels  of
the data.
6 Ravallion  (2000)  provides  an extensive  discussion  of sources  of discrepancies  between  national  accounts
and household  survey  measures  of  living  standards  and finds  that,  with  the exception  of the transition
economies  of Eastem  Europe  and  the Former  Soviet  Union,  growth  rates  of national  accounts  measures
track  growth  rates  of household  survey  measures  fairly  closely  on average.
11We use  two approaches  to measuring  the income  of the poor,  where  we define
the poor as the poorest  20% of the population. 7 For 796 country-year  observations
covering  137 countries,  we are able  to obtain  information  on the share of income
accruing  to the poorest  quintile  constructed  from nationally  representative  household
surveys  that meet  certain minimum  quality  standards. For these  observations,  we
measure  mean income  in the poorest  quintile  directly,  as the share of income  earned  by
the poorest  quintile  times mean income,  divided  by 0.2.  For a further 158 country-year
observations  we have information  on the Gini coefficient  but not the first quintile share.
For these observations,  we assume  that the distribution  of income  is lognormal,  and we
obtain  the share  of income  accruing  to the poorest  quintile  as the  20th percentile  of this
distribution. 8
Our data  on income  distribution  are drawn  from four different  sources. Our
primary  source  is the UN-WIDER  World Income  Inequality  Database,  which is a
substantial  extension  of the income  distribution  dataset  constructed  by Deininger  and
Squire  (1996). A total of 706 of our country-year  observations  are obtained  from this
source. In addition,  we obtain  97 observations  originally  included  in the sample
designated  as 'high-quality" by Deininger  and Squire  (1996)  that do not appear  in the
UN-WIDER  dataset. Our third data  source  is Chen  and Ravallion  (2000)  who construct
measures  of income  distribution  and poverty  from 265 household  surveys  in 83
7An  altemative  would  be  to  define  'the poor'  as  those  below  a fixed  poverty  line  such  as  the  dollar-a-day
poverty  line  used  by  the  World  Bank.  We  do  not  follow  this  approach  for  two  reaons.  First,  constructing  this
measure  requires  information  on  the  shape  of  the  entire  lower  tail  of  the  income  distribution,  and  we only
have  at  most  five  points  on  the  Lorenz  curve  for  each  country.  Second,  even  if this  information  were
available  or  were  obtained  by  some  kind  of interpolation  of  the  Lorenz  curve,  the  relationship  between
growth  in  average  incomes  and  growth  in  this  measure  of  average  incomes  of  the  poor  is much  more  difficult
to  interpret.  For  example,  if the  distribution  of  income  is  very  steep  near  the  poverty  line,  distribution-neutral
growth  in  average  incomes  will  lift a large  fraction  of  the  population  from  just  below  to  just  above  the  poverty
line  with  the  result  that  average  incomes  of  those  below  the  poverty  line  fall. Ali  and  Elbadawi  (2001)
provide  results  using  this  measure  of  incomes  of  the  poor  and  unsurprisingly  find  that  incomes  of  the  poor
according  to  this  measure  rise  less  than  proportionately  with  average  incomes.  Another  altemative  would
not  be  to examine  average  incomes  of  the  poor,  but  rather  the  fraction  of  the  population  below  some  pre-
specified  poverty  line. In  this  case,  it is  well-known  that  the  elasticity  of  the  poverty  headcount  with  respect
to average  income  varies  widely  across  countries  and  depends  among  other  things  on  the  level  and
distribution  of income.
8 If the  distribution  of  income  is lognormal,  i.e.  log  per  capita  income  - N(p,a),  and  the  Gini  coefficient  on  a
scale  from  0 to 100  is G,  the  standard-deviation  of  this  lognormal  distribution  is given  by
o =  a  2_.(_1+GI100)  where  o(.) denotes  the  cumulative  normal  distribution  function.  (Aitcheson  and
Brown  (1966)).  Using  the  properties  of  the  mean  of  the  truncated  lognormal  distribution  (e.g.  Johnston,  Kotz
and  Balakrishnan  (1994))  it can  be  shown  that  the  20' percentile  of  this  distribution  is  given  by
0(q-1  (0. 2) - c).
12developing  countries. As many  of the earlier  observations  in this source are  also
reported  in the Deininger-Squire  and UN-WIDER  database,  we obtain  only an additional
118 recent  observations  from this source. Finally,  we augment  our dataset  with 32
observations  primarily  from developed  countries  not appearing  in the above  three
sources,  that are reported  in Lundberg  and Squire  (2000). This results  in an overall
sample  of 953 observations  covering  137  countries  over  the period 1950-1999.  To our
knowledge  this is the largest  dataset  used  to study  the relationship  between  inequality,
incomes,  and  growth. Details  of the geographical  composition  of the dataset  are shown
in the first column  of Table 1.
This dataset  forms a highly  unbalanced  and irregularly  spaced  panel  of
observations.  While for a few countries  continuous  time series  of annual observations
on income  distribution  are  available  for long periods,  for most countries  only one or a
handful  of observations  are available,  with a median  number  of observations  per country
of 4.  Since our interest  is in growth  over  the medium  to long run, and since we do not
want the sample  to be dominated  by those  countries  where  income  distribution  data
happen  to be more  abundant,  we filter  the data as follows. For each country  we begin
with the first available  observation,  and then move  forward  in time until we encounter  the
next observation  subject  to the constraint  that at least  five years  separate  observations,
until we have  exhausted  the available  data for that country. 9 This results  in an
unbalanced  and irregularly  spaced  panel  of 418 country-year  observations  on mean
income  of the poor separated  by at least  five years  within countries,  and spanning  137
countries. The median  number  of observations  per  country  in this reduced  sample  is 3.
In our econometric  estimation  (discussed  in the following  subsection)  we restrict  the
sample  further  to the set of 285 observations  covering  92 countries  for which at least  two
spaced  observations  on mean  income  of the poor are available,  so that we can  consider
within-country  growth in mean incomes  of the poor over  periods  of at least  five years.
The median  length  of these  intervals  is 6 years. When  we consider  the effects  of
additional  control  variables,  the sample  is slightly  smaller  and varies across
specifications  depending  on data  availability.  The data sources  and geographical
9  We  prefer  this  method  of  filtering  the  data  over  the  alternative  of  simply  taking  quinquennial  or decadal
averages  since  our  method  avoids  the  unnecessary  introduction  of  noise  into  the  timing  of  the  distribution
data  and  the  other  variables  we  consider.  Since  one  of  the  most  interesting  of  these,  income  growth,  is  very
volatile,  this  mismatch  in  timing  is potentially  problematic.
13composition  of these  different  samples  is shown  in the second  and third columns  of
Table 1.
As is well known  there are substantial  difficulties  in comparing  income  distribution
data across  countries.' 0 Countries  differ  in the coverage  of the survey  (national  versus
subnational),  in the welfare  measure  (income  versus  consumption),  the measure  of
income  (gross  versus  net), and the unit of observation  (individuals  versus  households).
We are only able to very imperfectly  adjust  for these  differences. We have restricted  our
sample  to only income  distribution  measures  based  on nationally  representative  surveys.
For all surveys  we have information  on  whether  the welfare  measure  is income  or
consumption,  and for the majority  of these  we also know whether  the income  measure  is
gross  or net of taxes and transfers. While we do have information  on whether  the
recipient  unit is the individual  or the household,  for most of our observations  we do not
have information  on whether  the Lorenz  curve  refers  to the fraction  of individuals  or the
fraction  of households." As a result,  this last piece  of information  is of little help in
adjusting  for methodological  differences  in measures  of income  distribution  across
countries. We therefore  implement  the following  very crude adjustment  for observable
differences  in survey  type. We pool our sample  of 418 observations  separated  by at
least  five years,  and regress  both  the Gini  coefficient  and the first quintile share  on a
constant,  a set of regional  dummies,  and dummy  variables  indicating  whether  the
welfare  measure  is gross  income or whether  it is consumption.  We then  subtract  the
estimated mean  difference  between  these  two altematives  and the omitted  category  to
arrive at a set of distribution  measures  that notionally  correspond  to the distribution  of
income  net of taxes and transfers.' 2 The results  of these adjustment  regressions  are
reported  in Table 2.
3.2 Estimation
10  See  Atkinson  and Brandolini  (1999)  for a detailed  discussion  of these  issues.
"  This  information  is only  available  for  the  Chen-Ravallion  dataset  which  exclusively  refers  to  individuals
and for which  the Lorenz  curve  is consistently  constructed  using  the fraction  of individuals  on the horizontal
axis.
12 Our main  results  do not change  substantially  if we use three  other  possibilities:  (1) ignoring  differences  in
survey  type,  (2) including  dummy  variables  for  survey  type as strictly  exogenous  right-hand  side  variables  in
our regressions,  or (3)  adding  country  fixed  effects  to the adjustment  regression  so that the mean
differences  in survey  type are  estimated  from  the very  limited  within-country  variation  in survey  type.
14In order  to examine  how incomes  of the poor  vary with overall  incomes,  we
estimate  variants  of the following  regression  of the logarithm  of per capita  income  of the
poor (yP)  on the logarithm  of average  per  capita  income  (y) and a set of additional  control
variables  (X):
(1)  yPt  = (XO  + CC1  * Yct + a2'Xct  + Pc  + £ct
where c and t index  countries  and years,  respectively,  and 1.c  + Ect  is a composite  error
term including  unobserved  country  effects. We have  already  seen the pooled  version  of
Equation  (1)  with no control  variables  Xct in the top panel  of Figure 1 above. Since
incomes  of the poor are  equal  to the the first quintile  share  times average  income
divided  by 0.2, it is clear  that Equation  (1) is identical  to a regression  of the log of the first
quintile  share  on average  income  and a set of control  variables:
(2)  ln(Qt)  =  ao+  (ci -1).Yt+ c 2'Xct+l4c+8et
Moreover,  since empirically  the log of the first quintile  share  is almost  exactly  a linear
function  of the Gini coefficient,  Equation  (1) is almost  equivalent  to a regression  of a
negative  constant  times  the Gini  coefficient  on average  income  and a set of control
variables. 13
We are interested  in two key parameters  from Equation  (1). The first is a,,  which
measures  the elasticity  of income  of the poor  with  respect  to mean income. A value of
ct 1=1 indicates  that growth in mean income  is translated  one-for-one  into growth  in
income  of the poor. From  Equation  (2) this is equivalent  to the observation  that the
share of income  accruing  to the poorest  quintile  does not vary systematically  with
average  incomes  (ai-1=0). Estimates  of a1 greater  or less  than one indicate  that growth
more  than or less  than proportionately  benefits  those  in the poorest  quintile. The second
parameter  of interest  is a2 which  measures  the impact  of other  determinants  of income
13 In our  sample  of spaced  observations,  a regression  of  the log  first quintile  share  on the Gini  coefficient
delivers  a slope  of  -23.3 with  an R-squared  of 0.80.
15of the poor over and above  their impact  on mean  income. Equivalently  from Equation
(2), a2 measures  the impact  of these other  variables  on  the share of income  accruing  to
the poorest  quintile,  holding  constant  average  incomes.
Simple  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  estimation  of Equation  (1) using pooled
country-year  observations  is likely  to result  in inconsistent  parameter  estimates  for
several  reasons.' 4 Measurement  error  in average  incomes  or the other  control
variables  in Equation  (1)  will lead  to biases  that are difficult  to sign except  under  very
restrictive  assumptions.' 5 Since  we consider  only a fairly  parsimonious  set of right-hand-
side variables  in X, omitted  determinants  of the log quintile  share that are correlated  with
either X or average  incomes  can also bias our results. Finally,  there  may be reverse
causation  from average  incomes  of the poor  to average  incomes,  or equivalently  from
the log quintile  share  to average  incomes,  as suggested  by the large  empirical  literature
which has examined  the effects  of income  distribution  on subsequent  growth.  This
literature  typically  estimates  growth  regressions  with a measure  of initial  income
inequality  as an explanatory  variable,  such  as:
(3)  YC  D  PO+P'Y,-  I  (  I  Q1Ctk  '  + P2)-  13  '  9  Z-V lct  o
1 WYc.tk~P~
1 I  0.2  )_
This literature  has  found mixed  results  using  different  sample  and different  econometric
techniques. On the one hand, Perotti  (1996)  and Barro  (1999)  find evidence  of a
negative  effect  of income  inequality  on growth  (i.e. 01>0). On the other hand,  Forbes
(2000)  and Li and Zou (1998)  both  find positive  effects  of income  inequality  on growth,
(i.e. 13i<0). Finally,  Bannerjee  and Duflo (1999)  modestly,  and perhaps  most
appropriately,  conclude  that there  is at best weak  evidence  of a U-shaped  correlation
between  income  inequality  and growth  and that very little  can be said about causation  in
14 It should  also  be  clear  that  OLS  standard  errors  will  be  inconsistent  given  the  cross-observation
correlations  induced  by the unobserved  country-specific  effect.
'5 While at  first glance  it may appear  that measurement  error in per  capita  income  (which  is also  used  to
construct  our  measure  of incomes  of the poor)  will bias  the coefficient  on per  capita  income  towards  one in
Equation  (1),  this is not  the case. From  Equation  (2)  (which  of course  yields  identical  estimates  of the
parameters  of interest  as does  Equation  (1)) it is clear  that  we only  have  a problem  to the extent  that
measurement  error in the  first quintile  share  is correlated  with  average  incomes. Since  our data  on income
distribution  and average  income  are drawn  from  different  sources,  there  is no a priori  reason  to expect  such
a correlation.  When  average  income  is taken  from  the same  household  survey,  under  plausible
assumptions  even  measurement  error  in both  variables  will not lead  to inconsistent  coefficient  estimates
(Chen  and Ravallion  (1997)).
16either direction. Whatever  the true underlying  relationship,  it is clear that as long as D1I  is
not equal  to zero,  OLS estimation  of Equations  (1) or (2) will yield  inconsistent  estimates
of the parameters  of interest. For example,  high realizations  of A.  which result  in higher
incomes  of the poor relative  to mean  income  in Equation  (1) will also raise (lower)  mean
incomes  in Equation  (3), depending  on whether  P, is greater  than (less  than)  zero. This
could  induce  an upwards  (downwards)  bias into  estimates  of the elasticity  of incomes  of
the poor with respect  to mean incomes  in Equation  (1).
A final issue  in estimating  Equation  (1) is whether  we want to identify  our
parameters  of interest  using  the cross-country  or the time-series  variation  in the data on
incomes  of the poor,  mean incomes,  and other  variables.  An immediate  reaction  to the
presence  of unobserved  country-specific  effects p  in Equation  (1) is to estimate  it in
first differences. 16 The difficulty  with this option  is that it forces us to identify  our effects
of interest  using  the more limited  time-series  variation  in incomes  and income
distribution. 17 This raises  the possibility  that the signal-to-noise  ratio  in the within-
country  variation  in the data is too unfavorable  to allow  us to estimate  our parameters  of
interest  with any precision. In contrast,  the advantage  of estimating  Equation  (1) in
levels  is that we can exploit  the large  cross-country  variation  in incomes,  income
distribution,  and policies  to identify  our effects  of interest. The disadvantage  of this
approach  is that the problem  of omitted  variables  is more  severe in  the cross-section,
since in the differenced  estimation  we have  at least  managed  to dispose  of any  time-
invariant  country-specific  sources  of heterogeneity.
Our solution  to this dilemma  is to implement  a system  estimator  that combines
information  in both  the levels  and changes  of the data. 18 In particular,  we first difference
Equation  (1) to obtain growth  in income  of the poor  in country  c over  the period  from t-
k(c,t)  to t as a function  of growth  in mean  income  over  the same  period,  and changes in
the X variables:
le  Alternafively  one  could  enter  fixed  effects,  but  this-requires  the  much  stronger  assumption  that  the  error
terms  are  uncorrelated  with  the  right-hand  side  variables  at  all leads  and  lags.
17 Li,  Squire,  and  Zou  (1998)  document  the  much  greater  variability  of  income  distribution  across  countries
compared  to  within  countries.  In  our  sample  of  irregularly  spaced  observations,  the  standard  deviation  of
the  Gini  coefficient  pooling  all observations  in  levels  is 9.4. In  contrast  the  standard  deviation  of  changes  in
the  Gini  coefficient  is 4.7  (an  average  annual  change  of  0.67  times  an  average  number  of  years  over  which
the  change  is calculated  of  7).
18 This  type  of  estimator  has  been  proposed  in  a dynamic  panel  context  by  Arellano  and  Bover  (1995)  and
evaluated  by  Blundell  and  Bond  (1998).
17(4)  Yct -Yct-k(c,t)  =Cac*  (Yct  - Y  ct-k(ct)  ) +  a2'(Xct-X  -c,t(ct)  )+  (C  ct-  cA-k(c,t)  )
We then estimate  Equation  (1) and Equation  (4) as a system,  imposing  the restriction
that the coefficients  in the levels  and differenced  equation  are  equal. We address  the
three problems  of measurement  error,  omitted  variables,  and endogeneity  by using
appropriate  lags of right-hand-side  variables  as instruments.  In particular,  in Equation
(1) we instrument  for mean income  using  growth in mean  income  over  the five years
prior to time t. This preceding  growth  in mean  income  is by construction  correlated  with
contemporaneous  mean income,  provided  that p is not equal  to zero in Equation  (3).
Given  the vast body of evidence  on conditional  convergence,  this assumption  seems
reasonable  a priori,  and we can test  the strength  of this correlation  by examining  the
corresponding  first-stage  regressions. Differencing  Equation  (3) it is straightforward  to
see  that past  growth is also uncorrelated  with the error  term in Equation  (1), provided
that Ect  is not correlated  over  time. In Equation  (4) we instrument  for growth in mean
income  using  the level of mean  income  at the beginning  of the period,  and growth in the
five years  preceding  t-k(c,t).  Both of these are by construction  correlated  with growth in
mean income  over  the period from t-k(c,t) to t.  Moreover  it is straightforward  to verify
that they are uncorrelated  with  the error  term in Equation  (4) using  the same  arguments
as before.
In the version  of Equation  (1) without control  variables,  these  instruments  provide
us with three moment  conditions  with  which to identify  two parameters,  ao  and a1. We
combine  these moment  conditions  in a standard  generalized  method  of moments  (GMM)
estimation  procedure  to obtain  estimates  of these parameters. In addition,  we adjust  the
standard  errors  to allow  for heteroskedasticity  in the error  terms as well as the first-order
autocorrelation  introduced  into  the error  terms in Equation  (4) by differencing. Since  the
model  is overidentified  we can  test the validity  of our assumptions  that the instruments
are uncorrelated  with the error  terms using  tests of overidentifying  restrictions.
When  we introduce  additional  X variables  into Equation  (1) we also need  to take
a stand  on whether  or not to instrument  for these  as well. On a priori  grounds,  difficulties
with measurement  error  and omitted  variables  provide  as compelling  a reason  to
18instrument  for these  variables  as for income. Regarding  reverse  causation  the case is
less  clear,  since it seems  less plausible  to us that many  of the macro  variables  we
consider  respond  endogenously  to relative  incomes  of the poor. In what  follows  we
choose  not to instrument  for the X variables. This is in part  for the pragmatic  reason  that
this further  limits  our sample  size. More  importantly,  we take some  comfort  from the fact
that tests  of overidentifying  restrictions  pass  in the specifications  where  we instrument
for income  only, providing  indirect  evidence  that the X variables  are not correlated  with
the error  terms. In any  case,  we find qualitatively  quite similar  results  in the smaller
samples  where  we instrument,  and so these results  are not reported  for brevity.
194. Results
4.1 Growth  is Good  for the Poor
We start with our basic  specification  in which  we regress  the log of per capita
income  of the poor on the log of average  per capita  income,  without other  controls
(Equation  (1) with a2=0).  The results  of this basic specification  are presented  in detail in
Table 3. The five columns  in the top panel  provide  altemative  estimates  of Equation  (1),
in turn using information  in the levels  of the data,  the differences  of the data, and finally
our preferred  system  estimator  which combines  the two. The  first two columns  show the
results  from estimating  Equation  (1) in levels, pooling  all of the country-year
observations,  using OLS and single-equation  two-stage  least  squares  (2SLS),
respectively.  OLS gives a point estimate  of the elasticity  of income  of the poor  with
respect  to mean income  of 1.07,  which  is (just)  significantly  greater  than 1. As
discussed  in the previous  section  there are  reasons  to doubt the simple  OLS results.
When  we instrument  for mean income  using  growth  in mean income  over  the five
preceding  years  as an instrument,  the estimated  elasticity  increases  to  1.19. However,
this elasticity  is much  less precisely  estimated,  and so we do not reject  the null
hypothesis  that al=1.  In the first-stage  regression  for the levels  equation,  lagged  growth
is a highly  significant  predictor  of the current  level of income,  which  gives us some
confidence  in its validity  as an instrument.
The third and  fourth columns  in the top panel  of Table 3 show  the results  of OLS
and 2SLS  estimation  of the differenced  Equation  (4). We obtain  a point estimate  of the
elasticity  of income  of the poor  with respect  to mean  income  of 0.98 using OLS,  and a
slightly  smaller  elasticity  of 0.91  when  we instrument  using  lagged  levels and growth
rates  of mean  income. In both  the OLS and 2SLS  results  we cannot  reject  the null
hypothesis  that the elasticity  is equal  to one. In the first-stage  regression  for the
differenced  equation  (reported  in the second  column  of the bottom  panel),  both lagged
income  and twice-lagged  growth  are highly  significant  predictors  of growth.  Moreover,
the differenced  equation  is overidentified.  When  we test the validity  of the
overidentifying  restrictions  we do not reject  the null of a well-specified  model  for the
differenced  equation  alone  at conventional  significance  levels.
20In the last column  of Table 3 we combine  the information  in the levels  and
differences  in the system  GMM  estimator,  using  the same  instruments  as in the single-
equation  estimates  reported  earlier. The system  estimator  delivers  a point estimate  of
the elasticity  of 1.008,  which is not significantly  different  from 1. Since the system
estimator  is based on minimizing  a precision-weighted  sum of the moment  conditions
from the levels  and differenced  data,  the estimate  of the slope is roughly  an average  of
the slope  of the levels  and differenced  equation,  with somewhat  more  weight on  the
more-precisely  estimated  differenced  estimate. Since  our system  estimator  is
overidentified,  we can  test and do not reject  the null  that the instruments  are valid, in the
sense of being  uncorrelated  with the corresponding  error  terms in Equations  (1) and (4).
Finally,  the bottom  panel  of Table 3 reports  the first-stage  regressions  underlying  our
estimator,  and shows  that our instruments  have  strong  explanatory  power  for the
potentially-endogenous  income  and growth regressors.
We next  consider  a number  of variants  on this basic specification.  First, we add
regional  dummies  to the levels  equation,  and find  that dummies  for the East Asia and
Pacific,  Latin  America,  Sub-Saharan  Africa, and the Middle  East and North  Africa
regions  are negative  and significant  at the 10  percent  level  or better  (first column  of
Table 4). Since  the omitted  category  consists  of the rich  countries  of Western  Europe
plus Canada  and the United  States,  these dummies  reflect  higher  average  levels  of
inequality  in these regions  relative  to the rich  countries. Including  these  regional
dummies  reduces  the estimate  of the elasticity  of average  incomes  of the poor with
respect  to average  incomes  slightly  to 0.91,  but we still cannot  reject  the null hypothesis
that the slope of this relationship  is equal  to one (the p-value  for the test of this
hypothesis  is 0.313,  and is shown  in the fourth-last  row  of Table 4). We keep the
regional  dummies  in all subsequent  regressions.
Next  we add a time trend  to the regression,  in order  to capture  the possibility  that
there has been a secular  increase  or decrease  over  time in the share of income  accruing
to the poorest  quintile (second  column  of Table  4). The coefficient  on the time trend is
statistically  insignificant,  indicating  the absence  of systematic  evidence  of a trend  in the
share of income  of the bottom  quintile. Moreover,  in this specification  we find a point
estimate  of al=1.00, indicating  that average  incomes  in the bottom  quintile rise  exactly
21proportionately  with average  incomes. A closely  related  question  is whether  the
elasticity  of incomes  of the poor  with respect  to average  incomes  has  changed  over
time. To capture  this possibility  we augment  the basic  regression  with interactions  of
income  with dummies  for the 1970s,  1980s  and 1990s. The omitted  category  is the
1  960s,  and so the estimated  coefficients  on the interaction  terms capture  differences  in
the relationship  between  average  incomes  and the share of the poorest  quintile  relative
to this base period. We find  that none of these interactions  are  significant,  consistent
with  the view that the inequality-growth  relationship  has not changed  significantly  over
time. We again  cannot  reject  the null hypothesis  that c1=1 (p=0.455).
In the next two columns  of Table  4 we examine  whether  the slope  of the
relationship  between  average  incomes  and incomes  of the poorest  quintile  differs
significantly  by region  or by income  level. We first add interactions  of each of the
regional  dummies  with average  income,  in order  to allow  for the possibility  that the
effects  of growth  on the share of income  accruing  to the poorest  quintile  differ by region.
We find  that two regions  (East  Asia/Pacific  and Latin  America/Caribbean)  have
significantly  lower  slopes  than the omitted  category  of the rich countries. However,  we
cannot reject  the null hypothesis  that all of the region-specific  slopes  are  jointly equal  to
one. We also ask whether  the relationship  between  income  and the share of the bottom
quintile  varies with  the level of development,  by interacting  average  incomes  in Equation
(1) with real GDP per capita in 1990  for each country. When  we do this, we find no
evidence  that the relationship  is significantly  different  in rich  and poor countries,  contrary
to the Kuznets  hypothesis  that inequality  increases  with income  at low levels  of
development."'
In the last column  of Table 4 we ask whether  the relationship  between  growth  in
average  incomes  and incomes  of the poor is different  during  periods  of negative  and
positive  growth. This allows  for the possibility  that the costs  of economic  crises  are
borne  disproportionately  by poor people. We add an interaction  term of average
incomes  with a dummy  variable  which  takes the value one when  growth in average
incomes  is negative. These  episodes  certainly  qualify  as economic  crises  since they
correspond  to negative  average  annual  growth  over a period  of at least  five years.
However,  the interaction  term is tiny and statistically  indistinguishable  from zero,
22indicating  that there is no evidence  that the share  of income  that goes  to the poorest
quintile  systematically  rises  or falls during  periods  of negative  growth.
4.2  Growth  Determinants and Incomes  of the Poor
The previous  section  has documented  that the relationship  between  growth of
income  of the poor and overall  economic  growth  is one-to-one.  That finding  suggests
that a range  of policies  and institutions  that are associated  with higher  growth  will also
benefit  the poor proportionately.  However,  it is possible  that growth  from different
sources  has differential  impact  on the poor. In this section  we take a number  of the
policies  and institutions  that have  been identified  as pro-growth  in the empirical  growth
literature,  and examine  whether  there is any  evidence  that any  of these  variables  has
disproportionate  effects  on the poorest  quintile. The five indicators  that we focus on are
inflation, which Fischer  (1993)  finds to be bad for growth;  government  consumption,
which Easterly  and Rebelo  (1993)  find to be bad for growth;  exports  and imports  relative
to GDP,  which Frankel  and Romer  (1999)  find to be good  for growth;  a measure  of
financial development,  which  Levine,  Loayza  and Beck  (2000)  have shown  to have
important  causal  effects  on growth;  and a measure  of the strength  of property  rights  or
rule of law The particular  measure  is from Kaufmann,  Kraay,  and Zoido-Lobat6n  (1999).
The importance  of property  rights  for growth  has been  established  by, among  others,
Knack  and Keefer  (1995). In Figure  2 we plot  each of these measures  against  the log
share of income  of the poorest  quintile  as a descriptive  device. Variable  definitions  and
sources  are reported  in Table  9.  A quick look at Figure  2 suggests  that there is little in
the way of obvious  bivariate  relationships  between  each  of these  variables  and our
measure  of income  distribution,  and what  little relationship  there  is is often driven  by a
small number  of influential  observations.  This first look at the data suggests  to us that it
will be difficult  to find significant  and robust  effects  of any of these  variables  on the share
of income  accruing  to the poorest  quintile  - and  we confirm  this in  the regressions  which
follow.
First,  we take the basic  regression  from the first column  of Table  4 and add these
variables  one at a time (shown  in the first five columns  of Table 5). Since mean income
is included  in each of these regressions,  the effect  of these  variables  that works  through
19  Using  a quadratic  term  to  capture  this  potential  nonlinearity  yields  similarly  insignificant  results.
23overall  growth is already  captured  there. The coefficient  on the growth  determinant  itself
therefore  captures  any  differential  impact  that this variable  has on the income  of the
poor,  or equivalently,  on  the share of income  accruing  to the poor. In the case of trade
volumes,  we find a small, negative,  and statistically  insignificant  effect  on the income
share of the bottom  quintile. The same  is true  for government  consumption  as a share
of GDP,  and inflation,  where  higher  values  of both  are associated  with lower income
shares  of the poorest  quintile,  although  again  insignificantly  so. The point  estimates  of
the coefficients  on the measure  of financial  development  and on rule of law indicate  that
both  of these  variables  are associated  with higher  income  shares  in the poorest  quintile,
but again,  each of these effects  is statistically  indistinguishable  from zero. When  we
include  all five measures  together,  the coefficients  on each  are similar  to those in the the
simpler  regressions.  However,  government  consumption  as a share of GDP now has an
estimated  effect  on the income  share of the poorest  that is negative  and significant  at the
10% level. In addition,  inflation  continues  to have a negative  effect,  which  just falls short
of significance  at the 10% level. 20
Our empirical  specification  only allows  us to identify  any  differential  effect of
these macroeconomic  and institutional  variables  on incomes  of the poor relative  to
average  incomes. What about  the overall  effect  of these  variables,  which combines  their
effects  on growth  with  their effects  on income  distribution? In order  to answer  this
question  we also require  estimates  of the effects  of these  variables  on growth based  on
a regression  like Equation  (3). Since Equation  (3) includes  a measure  of income
inequality  as one of the determinants  of growth,  we estimate  Equation  (3) using  the
same  panel  of irregularly  spaced  data on average  incomes  and other  variables  that we
have been using  thus  far. 21 Clearly  this limited  dataset  is not ideal  for estimating  growth
regressions,  since  our sample  is very restricted  by the relative  scarcity  of income
distribution  data. Nevertheless  it is useful  to estimate  this equation  in our data set for
consistency  with  the previous  results,  and also to verify  that the main findings  of the
cross-country  literature  on economic  growth  are present  in our sample.
20 This particular  result  is primarily  driven  by a small  number  of very high inflation  episodes.
21 Since  our  panel  is irregularly  spaced,  the  coefficient  on  lagged  income  in  the  growth  regression  should  in
principle  be a function  of  the length  of  the interval  over  which  growth  is calculated.  There  are two  ways to
address  this  issue.  In  what  follows  below,  we  simply  restrict  attention  to  the  vast  majority  of  our
observations  which  correspond  to growth  spells  between  5 and 7 years  long,  and  then ignore  the
dependence  of this coefficient  on the length  of the growth  interval. The  alternative  approach  is to introduce
this  dependence  explicity  by  assuming  that  the  coefficient  on  lagged  income  is  pk(c't) Doing  so  yields  very
similar  results  to those  reported  here.
24We include  in the vector  of additional  explanatory  variables  a measure  of the
stock of human  capital  (years  of secondary  schooling  per worker)  as well as the five
growth  determinants  from Table 5. We also include  the human  capital  measure  in order
to make  our growth  regression  comparable  to that of Forbes  (2000)  who applies  similar
econometric  techniques  in a similar  panel  data  set in order  to study  the effect  of
inequality  on growth. In order  to reduce  concerns  about  endogeneity  of these  variables
with respect  to growth,  we enter  each of them  as an average  over the five years prior to
year  t-k. We estimate  the growth  regression  in Equation  (3) using  the same  system
estimator  that combines  information  in the levels  and differences  of the data, although
our choice  of lags as instruments  is slightly  different  from before. 22 In the levels
equation,  we instrument  for lagged  income  with growth  in the preceding  five years, and
we do not need to instrument  for the remaining  growth  determinants  under  the
assumption  that they are predetermined  with respect  to the error  term v t. In the
differenced  equation  we instrument  for lagged  growth  with  the twice-lagged  log-level  of
income,  and for the remaining  variables  with  their twice-lagged  levels.
The results  of this growth  regression  are reported  in the first column  of Table 6.
Most of the variables  enter  significantly  and with  the expected  signs. Secondary
education,  financial  development,  and better  rule of law are all positively  and significantly
associated  with growth. Higher  levels  of government  consumption  and inflation  are both
negatively  associated  with growth,  although  only the former  is statistically  significant.
Trade  volumes  are positively  associated  with growth,  although  not significantly  so,
possibly  reflecting  the relatively  small  sample  on  which  the estimates  are based (the
sample  of observations  is considerably  smaller  than in Table 5 given  the requirement  of
additional  lags of right-hand  side variables  to use  as instruments).  Interestingly,  the log
of the first  quintile share  enters  negatively  (although  not significantly),  consistent  with the
finding  of Forbes  (2000)  that greater  inequality  is associated  with higher  growth.
We next  combine  these  estimates  with the estimates  of Equation  (1)  to arrive at
the cumulative  effect  of these  growth  determinants  on incomes  of the poor. From
22 See  for  example  Levine,  Loayza,  and  Beck  (2000)  for  a similar  application  of  this  econometric  technique
to cross-country  growth  regressions.
25Equation  (1) we can express  the effect  of a permanent  increase  in each of the growth
determinants  on the level of average  incomes  of the poor as:
(5)  aycp  =  at  +_(aI-1)_-a  _  +a2
aXct  aXct  axct
where 2X.ct denotes  the impact  on average  incomes  of this permanent  change  in X. The
axct
first term captures  the effect on incomes  of the poor of a change  in one of the
determinants  of growth,  holding  constant  the distribution  of income. We refer  to this as
the ugrowth  effect"  of this variable. The second  term captures  the effects  of a change  in
one of the determinants  of growth  on incomes  of the poor through  changes  in the
distribution  of income. This consists  of two pieces: (i) the difference  between  the
estimated  income  elasticity  and one times  the growth  effect,  i.e. the extent to which
growth in average  incomes  raises  or lowers  the share  of income  accruing  to the poorest
quintile;  and (ii)  the direct  effects  of policies  on incomes  of the poor in Equation  (1).
In order  to evaluate  Equation  (5)  we need  an expression  for the growth  effect
term. We obtain  this by solving  Equations  (1) and (3)  for the dynamics  of average
income,  and obtain:
(6)
yct  = P  + ,  ao + (p +  ,  a,)  .YCt-k  + (P,  a2 +  2)XC,t-k + llc +  1 .:  + Vct +I  sEct
Iterating  Equation  (6) forward,  we find that the estimated  long-run  effect on  the level of
income  of a permanent  change  in one of the elements  in X is:
(7)  'Yt  PI '  *  2  + P2
ax't  1  -(P  + Pl -2)
The remaining  columns  of Table 6 put all these  pieces  together. The second
column  repeats  the results  reported  in the final column  of Table 5. The next column
26reports  the standard  deviations  of each of the variables  of interest,  so that we can
calculate  the impact  on incomes  of the poor of a one-standard  deviation  permanent
increase  in each variable. 23 The remaining  columns  report  the growth  and distribution
effects  of these  changes,  which are also summarized  graphically  in Figure 3. The main
story here is that the growth  effects  are  large and the distribution  effects  are small.
Improvements  in rule of law and greater  financial  development  of the magnitudes
considered  here,  as well as reductions  in government  consumption  and lower  inflation  all
raise incomes  in the long  run by 15-20  percent. The point estimate  for more  trade
openness  is at the low end of existing  results  in the literature:  about a 5% increase  in
income  from a one standard  deviation  increase  in openness. This should  therefore  be
viewed  as a rather  conservative  estimate  of the benefit  of openness  on incomes  of the
poor. In contrast,  the effects  of these  policies  that operate  through  their effects  on
changes  in the distribution  of income  are much  smaller  in magnitude,  and with the
exception  of financial  development  work in the same  direction  as the growth  effects.
4.3 Globalization and the Poor
One possibly  surprising  result  in Table 5 is the lack  of any evidence  of a
significant  negative  impact  of openness  to international  trade on incomes  of the poor.
While this is consistent  with the finding  of Edwards  (1997)  who also finds no evidence  of
a relationship  between  various  measures  of trade  openness  and inequality  in a sample
of 44 countries, a number  of other  recent  papers  have found evidence  that openness  is
associated  with higher  inequality. Barro  (1999)  finds  that trade  volumes  are significantly
positively  associated  with the Gini coefficient  in a sample  of 64 countries,  and that the
disequalizing  effect  of openness  is greater  in poor  countries. In a panel  data set of 320
irregularly  spaced  annual  observations  covering  only 34 countries,  Spilimbergo  et. al.
(1999)  find that several  measures  of trade openness  are associated  with higher
inequality,  and that this effect  is lower in countries  where  land and capital  are abundant
and higher  where skills are abundant. Lundberg  and Squire  (2000)  consider  a panel  of
119 quinquennial  observations  covering  only 38 countries  and  find that an increase  from
zero  to one in the Sachs-Wamer  openness  index  is associated  with a 9.5 point increase
in the Gini index,  which  is significant  at the 10% level.
23 The  only  exception  is  the rule  of law index  which  by construction  has a standard  deviation  of one. Since
perceptions  of the rule  of law tend  to change  only  very  slowly  over  time,  we consider  a smaller  change  of
27Several  factors  may contribute  to the difference  between  these  findings  and ours,
including  (i) differences  in the measure  of inequality  (all the previous  studies  consider
the Gini index  while we focus on the income  share  of the poorest  quintile,  although  given
the high correlation  between  the two this factor is least  likely  to be important);  (ii)
differences  in the sample  of countries  (with  the exception  of the paper by Barro,  all of the
papers  cited above  restrict  attention  to considerably  smaller  and possibly  non-
representative  samples  of countries  than  the 76 countries  which appear  in our basic
openness  regression,  and in addition  the paper  by Spilimbergo  et. al. uses  all available
annual observations  on inequality  with  the result  that countries  with regular  household
surveys  tend to be heavily  overrepresented  in the sample  of pooled observations);  (iii)
differences  in the measure  of openness  (Lundberg  and Squire  (2000)  for example  focus
on the Sachs-Warner  index  of openness  which  has been  criticized  for proxying  the
overall  policy  environment  rather  than openness  per se 24); (iv) differences  in
econometric  specification  and  technique.
A complete  accounting  of which  of these  factors  contribute  to the differences  in
results  is beyond  the scope  of this short section. However,  several  obvious  extensions
of our basic model  can be deployed  to make  our  specification  more  comparable  to these
other studies. First,  we consider  several  different  measures  of openness,  some  of which
correspond  more  closely  with those used  in the other  studies  mentioned  above. We first
(like Barro  (1999)  and Spilimbergo  et al. (1999))  purge  our measure  of trade volumes  of
the geographical  determinants  of trade, by regressing  it on a trade-weighted  measure  of
distance  from trading  partners,  and a measure  of country  size  and taking the residuals
as an adjusted  measure  of trade  volumes. 25 Since these  geographical  factors  are time
invariant,  this will only influence  our results  to the extent  that they are driven  by the
cross-country  variation  in the data  and to the extent  that these  geographical
determinants  of trade  volumes  are also  correlated  with  the share of income  of the
poorest  quintile. Second,  we use  the Sachs-Wamer  index  in order to compare  our
results  more  closely  with  those  of Lundberg  and Squire  (2000). Finally,  we also consider
0.25,  which  still delivers  very large  estimated  growth  effects.
24 See  for example  the criticism  of Rodriguez  and  Rodrik  (1999),  who  note  that most  of the explanatory
power  of the Sachs-Wamer  index  derives  from  the components  that  measure  the black  market  premium  on
foreign  exchange  and  whether  the  state  holds  a monopoly  on  exports.
25 Specifically,  we use the instrument  proposed  by Frankel  and Romer  (1999)  and the logarithm  of
population  in 1990  as right-hand  side  variables  in a pooled  OLS  regression.
28three  other measures  of openness  not considered  by  the above  authors:  collected  import
taxes as a share  of imports,  a dummy  variable  taking  the value one if the country  is a
member  of the World  Trade  Organization  (or its predecessor  the GATT),  and a dummy
variable  taking the value  one if the country  has restrictions  on intemational  capital
movements  as reported  in the International  Monetary  Fund's  Report  on Exchange
Arrangements  and Exchange  Controls. Figure  4 reports  the simple  correlations  between
each of these measures  and the logarithm  of the first quintile  share,  in levels  and in
differences  analogously  to Figure  2. Variable  definitions  and sources  are reported  in
Table 9. As was the case in Figure  2, there is little  obvious  evidence  of any kind of
systematic  bivariate  relationship  between  each of these measures  of openness  and the
share of income  of the poorest  quintile.
We also consider  two variants  on our basic  specification.  First, in order to
capture  the possibility  that greater  openness  has differential  effects  at different  levels  of
development,  we introduce  an interaction  of the openness  measures  with the log-level  of
real GDP per capita in 1990  for each  country. Given  the high  correlation  in levels
between  per capita  income  and capital  per  worker,  this interaction  may be thought of as
capturing  in a very crude  way the possibility  that the effects  of trade  on inequality
depend  on countries'  relative  factor abundance.  The second  elaboration  we consider  is
to add an interaction  of openness  with  the logarithm  of arable  land per  capita,  as well as
adding  this variable  directly. This allows  a more  general  formulation  of the hypothesis
that the effects  of openness  depend  on countries'  factor endowments.
The results  of these  extensions  are presented  in Table 7.  Each  of the columns  of
Table 7 corresponds  to a different  measure  of openness,  and the three horizontal  panels
correspond  to the three  variants  discussed  above. Two main  results  emerge  from this
table. First,  in all of the specifications  considered  below,  we continue  to find that
average  incomes  of the poor rise  proportionately  with average  incomes: in each
regression,  we do not reject  the null hypothesis  that the coefficient  on average  incomes
is equal  to one. This indicates  that our previous  results  on the lack of any significant
association  between  average  incomes  and the log first quintile  share are robust  to the
inclusion  of these  additional  control  variables. Second,  we find no evidence  whatsoever
of a significant  negative  relationship  between  any of these measures  of openness  and
average  incomes  of the poor. In all but one case,  we cannot  reject  the null hypothesis
29that the relevant  openness  measure  is not signficantly  associated  with the income  share
of the bottom  quintile,  holding  constant  average  incomes. The only exception  to this
overall  pattem  is the measure  of capital  controls,  where  the presence  of capital  controls
is significantly  (at the 10 percent  level)  associated  with a lower income  share of the
poorest  quintile. Overall,  however,  we conclude  from this table that there is very little
evidence  of a significant  relationship  between  the income  share of the poorest  quintile
and a wide range  of measures  of exposure  to the international  economy. The only other
finding  of interest  in this table is unrelated  to the question  of openness  and incomes  of
the poor. In the bottom  panel  where  we include  arable  land  per capita and its interaction
with openness  measures,  we find some  evidence  that countries  with greater  arable  land
per worker have a lower  income  share  of the poorest  quintile. This is consistent  with
Leamer  et. al. (1999)  who find  that cropland  per  capita is significantly  associated  with
higher  inequality  in a cross-section  of 49 countries.
4.4 Other Determinants  of Incomes  of the Poor
Finally  we consider  a number  of other  factors  that may  have direct  effects  on
incomes  of the poor  through  their  effect  on income  distribution.  We consider  four such
variables: primary  educational  attainment,  social  spending,  agricultural  productivity,  and
formal  democratic  institutions. Of these  four variables,  only the primary  education
variable  tends  to be significantly  correlated  with economic  growth,  and even here recent
evidence  suggests  that much  of this correlation  reflects  reverse  causation  from growth  to
greater schooling  (Bils and Klenow  (2000)).
However,  these policies  may be especially  important  for the poor. Consider  for
example  primary  enrollment  rates. Most of the countries  in the sample  are developing
countries  in which deviations  from complete  primary  school  enrollments  are most likely
to reflect  the low enrollment  among  the poorest  in society. This in turn may be an
important  factor influencing  the extent  to which  the poor participate  in growth. Similarly,
depending  on the extent  to which  public  spending  on health  and education  is effective
and well-targeted  towards  poor people,  a greater  share  of social  spending  in public
spending  can be associated  with better  outcomes  for poor  people. Greater  labor
productivity  in agriculture  relative  to the rest of the economy  may benefit poor people
disproportionately  to the extent  that the poor  are more  likely  to live in rural areas  and
30derive  their livelihood  from agriculture.  And finally,  formal  democratic  institutions  may
matter to the extent  that they give voice to poor people  in the policymaking  process.
Figure  5 reports  the simple  correlations  between  each of these  measures  and the
income  share of the poorest  quintile,  in levels  and in differences  as before. Variable
definitions  and sources  are reported  in Table 9.  In the case of differences,  there is again
little in the way of even a simple  bivariate  relationship  between  changes  in these
variables  and changes  in the income  share of the poorest  quintile. In levels,  there is a
weak positive  relationship  between  the income  share  of the poorest  quintile  and primary
education,  agricultural  productivity,  and the democracy  index, and a negative
relationship  with the share of social  spending  in total spending. However,  as we see in
Table 8,  these  relationships  are  generally  not robust  to the inclusion  of average  income.
In particular,  while  years  of primary  education  and relative  productivity  in agriculture  both
enter  positively,  neither  is significant  at conventional  levels. In the regression  with social
spending,  we also include  overall  government  consumption  in order to capture  both  the
level and compositional  effects  of public  spending. Overall  government  spending
remains  negatively  associated  with incomes  of the poor,  and the share of this spending
devoted  to health  and education  does not enter  significantly.  This may not be very
surprising,  since in many  developing  countries,  these  social  expenditures  often benefit
the middle  class and the rich  primarily,  and the simple  share  of public  spending  on the
social sectors  is not a good measure  of whether  government  policy  and spending  is
particularly  pro-poor. Finally,  the measure  of formal  democratic  institutions  enters
positively  and significantly  (although  only at the 10%  level). However,  this result  is not
very robust. In our large  sample  of developed  and developing  countries,  measures  of
formal  democratic  institutions  tend  to be significantly  correlated  with other  aspects  of
institutional  quality,  especially  the rule of law index  considered  earlier. When  we include
the other  growth  determinants  in the regression,  the coefficient  on the index  of
democratic  institutions  is no longer  significant.
315. Conclusions
It should  come  as no surprise  that the general  relationship  between  growth of
income  of the poor and growth of mean income  is one-to-one.  What is new here is that
we show  that a number  of popular  ideas  about  the poverty-growth  nexus are not
supported  by empirical  evidence  in a very large sample  of countries  spanning  the last
four decades. In particular,
*  The poverty-growth  relationship  is not different  in negative  growth (crisis)  episodes
and normal  growth  periods;
*  The poverty  impact  of growth  has not declined  in recent  decades;
*  Growth  spurred  by open  trade  or other  macro  policies  (good  rule of law,  low
government  consumption,  macro  stability,  financial  development)  benefits  the poor
as much  as it does the typical household;  and
- Growth  of income  of the poor does not appear  to respond  systematically  to a number
of supposedly  'pro-poor" policies  including  formal  democratic  institutions  and public
expenditure  on health  and education.
This does not imply  that growth  is all that is needed  to improve  the lives of the poor.
Rather,  these  findings  leave  plenty  of room  for further  work, because  they emphasize
the fact that we know very little  about  what systematically  causes changes  in the
distribution  of income. What we do learn  is that growth  generally  does benefit  the poor
as much  as everyone  else,  so that the growth-enhancing  policies  of good rule of law,
fiscal  discipline,  and openness  to international  trade  should  be at the center  of
successful  poverty  reduction  strategies.
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35Table 1:  Sources for Income Distribution Data
Number  of Observations
Total  Spaced  Sample Changes
By Source
UN-WIDER  World  Income  Inequality  Database  706  289  199
Deininger  and  Squire  High  Quality  Sample  97  45  28
World Bank Poverty  Monitoring  Website  118  68  45
Lundberg  and Squire  (2000)  32  16  13
By Region
East  Asia and  Pacific  178  77  22
E. Europe  and Central  Asia  172  52  66
Latin  America  and Caribbean  160  88  95
Middle  East/North  Africa  41  31  24
South  Asia  73  28  18
Sub-Saharan  Africa  90  59  29
Other  239  83  31
Total  953  418  285
Notes:  This  table  shows  the  four  sources  of  data  on  income  distribution  on  which  we rely  to construct
estimates  of  mean  incomes  of  the  poor.  Total  refers  to the  total  number  of  annual  observations.  Spaced
sample  refers  to  observations  separated  by  at least  five  years  from  each  other  within  countries.  Changes
refers  to  the  source  of  the  final  year  for  each  pair  of  observations  for  which  it is possible  to  construct  a
five-year  change  within  countries  in incomes  of  the  poor.
36Table 2:  Adjustments to Gini Coefficients and Income Shares
Gini Coefficient  Income  Share of Bottom  Quintile
Coefficient  Std Err  Coefficient  Std Err
Constant  31.160  0.664  0.072  0.002
Gross Income  Dummy  4.046  1.011  *  -0.011  0.003
Expenditure  Dummy  -1.397  1.412  0.002  0.003
East  Asia and Pacific  4.673  1.088  *  -0.001  0.003
E. Europe  and Central Asia  -2.656  1.502  *  0.022  0.004
Middle  EasVNorth  Africa  9.095  1.625  -0.007  0.004
Latin  America and Caribbean  15.550  1.015  ***  -0.023  0.003
South  Asia  3.519  1.502  **  0.009  0.004  **
Sub-Saharan  Africa  16.186  1.772  -0.018  0.005
Notes: This table reports the results of a pooled OLS regression of the indicated inequality measures on
the indicated variables.  Standard errors are White-corrected for heteroskedasticity.
37Table  3:  Basic  Specification
Estimates  of Growth  Elasticity
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Levels  Differences  System
No Inst  Inst  No Inst  Inst
Intercept  -1.762  -2.720  -1.215
0.210  1.257  0.629
Slope  1.072  1.187  0.983  0.913  1.008
0.025  0.150  0.076  0.106  0.076
P-Ho:  a1=1  0.004  0.213  0.823  0.412  0.916
P-OID  0.174  0.163
T-NOSC  -0.919
# Observations  269  269  269  269  269





Lagged  Growth  0.956
0.293
Lagged  Income  0.011
0.002
Twice  Lagged  Growth  0.284
0.094
P-Zero  Slopes  0.007  0.001
Notes:  The  top  panel  reports  the  results  of  estimating  Equation  (1)  (columns  1  and  2),  Equation  (3)
(columns  3 and  4),  and  the  system  estimator  combining  the  two  (column  5). OLS  and  IV  refer  to  ordinary
least  squares  and  instrumental  variables  estimation  of  Equations  (1)  and  (3). The  bottom  panel  reports
the  corresponding  first-stage  regressions  for IV  estimation  of  Equations  (1)  and  (3).  The  row  labelled  P-
Ho:  ai=1 reports  the  p-value  associated  with  the  test  of  the  null  hypothesis  that  a1=1  .The  row  labelled  P-
OlD  reports  the  P-value  associated  with  the  test  of  overdentifying  restrictions.  The  row  labelled  T-NOSC
reports  the t-statistic  for the test of no second-order  serial  correlation  in the differened  residuals.
Standard  errors  are corrected  for heteroskedasticity  and  for the  first-order  autocorrelation  induced  by  first
differencing  using  a standard  Newey-West  procedure.
38Table 4: Variants on the Basic Specification
Regional Dummies  Regional Dummies  Regional Dummies  Regional Dummies  Regional Dummies  Regional Dummies
Common Trend  Slopes Differ by Decade  Slopes Differ by Region Slopes Differ with Income Slopes Differ +/- Growth
Coef  Std. Err  Coef  Std. Err  Coef  Std. Err  Coef  Std. Err  Coef  Std. Err  Coef  Std. Err
Constant  -0.114  0.876  -0.050  4.824  -0.465  0.698  -4.308  1.421  -0.762  0.815  -1.254  0.647
ln(Per Capita GDP)  0.905  0.094  1.003  0.139  0.941  0.079  1.355  0.153  0.988  0.196  1.027  0.070
EAP  -0.168  0.102  -0.079  0.143  -0.127  0.088  3.733  1.568  -0.103  0.064  -0.050  0.081
ECA  -0.023  0.147  0.085  0.202  0.003  0.131  2.965  3.944  0.050  0.115  0.132  0.109
LAC  -0.618  0.121  -0.512  0.166  - -0.572  0.101  8.244  3.083  -0.542  0.095  -0.490  0.095
MENA  -0.275  0.140  -0.152  0.199  -0.246  0.118  2.213  2.380  -0.189  0.100  -0.127  0.109
SA  -0.079  0.208  0.128  0.311  0.000  0.166  2.615  1.616  0.055  0.135  0.185  0.154
SSA  -0.685  0.288  -0.369  0.355  -0.550  0.243  2.111  2.008  -0.422  0.170  -0.384  0.210
Time  0.000  0.003
y x 1970s  -0.001  0.008
yx  1980s  0.003  0.010
y x 1990s  0.005  0.010
y  x  EAP  -0.413 0.173
yx ECA  -0.290  0.474
y  x  LAC  -1.019 0.368
y  x  MENA  -0.243  0.285
y  x  SA  -0.239  0.188
yxSSA  -0.230  0.256
y x y90  -0.001  0.013
y x (Dummy Negative  Growth)  0.009  0.008
P-Ho: a1=1  0.313  0.983  0.455  0.020  0.949  0.694
P-OID  0.390  0.240  0.126  0.133  0.209  0.174
T-NOSC  -0.948  -0.921  -0.938  -1.571  -0.932  -0.907
# Observations  269  269  269  269  269  269
Notes:  The  row  labelled  P-Ho:  a,=1  reports  the  p-value  associated  with the  test  of the  null hypothesis  that  a1=1.  The  row  labelled  P-OID  reports  the  P-value
associated  with  the test  of overidentifying  restrictions.  The  row  labelled  T-NOSC  reports  the  t-statistic  for  the  test  of  no second-order  serial  correlation  in the
differened  residuals.  Standard  errors  are corrected  for heteroskedasticity  and  for the first-order  autocorrelation  induced  by first  differencing  using  a standard
Newey-West  procedure.
39Table 5:  Growth Determinants and Incomes of the Poor
Trade  Government  log(1+lnflation  Financial  Rule  of Law  All Growth
Volumes  Consumption/GDP  Rate)  Development  Index  Variables
Coef  Std.  Err.  Coef  Std.Err.  Coef  Std.Err.  Coef  Std.Err.  Coef  Std.  Err.  Coef  Std.Err.
ln(Per  Capita  GDP)  1.094  0.108  ***  1.050  0.085  1.020  0.089  0.995  0.119  0.914  0.105  1.140  0.100
(Exports+lmports)/GDP  -0.039  0.088  0.023  0.056
Government  Consumption  -0.571  0.419  -0.746  0.386  *
/GDP
ln(1+lnflation)  -0.136  0.103  -0.163  0.107
Commercial  Bank  Assets  0.032  0.257  -0.209  0.172
(Total  Bank  Assets
Rule  of Law  0.084  0.069  -0.032  0.060
P-Ho: a1=1  0.386  0.555  0.825  0.968  0.412  0.164
P-OID  0.257  0.168  0.159  0.350  0.279  0.393
T-NOSC  -0.751  -0.506  -0.261  -0.698  -0.945  -0.762
# Observations  223  237  253  232  268  189
Notes: All regressions  include  regional  dummies.  The row labelled  P-Ho:  a,=1 reports  the p-value  associated  with the test of  the null hypothesis  that acl=l.
The row  labelled  P-OID  reports  the P-value  associated  with the test of overidentifying  restrictions.  The  row labelled  T-NOSC  reports  the t-statistic  for the test
of no second-order  serial  correlation  in the differened  residuals. Standard  errors  are  corrected  for heteroskedasticity  and for  the first-order  autocorrelation
induced  by  first differencing  using  a standard  Newey-West  procedure.
40Table  6: Growth  and Distribution  Effects
Growth Regression  Income  of Poor  Regression  Standard  Growth  Distribution
Coef  Std.Err.  Coef  Std.Err.  Deviation  Effect  Effect
Income  1.140  0.101  ***
Lagged  Income  0.668  0.169
Lagged  Inequality  -0.089  0.062
Secondary  Education  0.097  0.057  *
Trade Volumes  0.045  0.074  0.024  0.056  0.280  0.035  0.012
Inflation  -0.145  0.131  -0.162  0.107  0.275  -0.104  -0.059
Government  Consumption  -0.973  0.415  **  -0.744  0.387  *  0.054  -0.143  -0.060
Financial  Development  0.374  0.167  **  -0.208  0.172  0.153  0.175  -0.007
Rule of Law  0.180  0.082  **  -0.032  0.060  0.250  0.133  0.011
Notes: The  first column  reports  the results  of estimating  the growth  regression  in Equation  All regressions  include  regional  dummies.  The row labelled  P-Ho:
aj=1 reports  the p-value  associated  with  the test of  the null  hypothesis  that  a=1. The  row labelled  P-OID  reports  the P-value  associated  with the test of
overidentifying  restrictions.  The  row labelled  T-NOSC  reports  the t-statistic  for  the test of no second-order  serial  correlation  in the differened  residuals.
Standard  errors  are  corrected  for heteroskedasticity  and for  the first-order  autocorrelation  induced  by  first differencing  using  a standard  Newey-West
procedure.
41Table 7:  Openness  and Incomes  of The Poor
Trade  Adjusted  Trade  Sachs-Wamer  Import  Taxes  Dummy  for  Dummy  for
Volumes  Volumes  Trade  Policy  Index  As Share  of Imports  WTO  Membership  Capital  Controls
Coef  Std.Err.  Coef  Std.Err.  Coef  Std,Err.  Coef  Std.Err.  Coef  Std.Err.  Coef  Std.Err
Basic
In(Per Capita GDP)  1.094  0.108  *  1.047  0.133  1.077  0.092  0.936  0.136  *^*  0.917  0.104  0.869  0.116
Openness  Measure  -0.039  0.088  -0.038  0.167  -0.071  0.065  -0.161  0.358  0.021  0.043  -0.090  0.051
P-Ho: (x1=1  0.386  0.724  0.407  0.638  0.428  0.259
P-OID  0.257  0.135  0.431  0.074  0.425  0.183
T-NOSC  -0.751  -0.767  -0.677  1.263  -0.998  -1.084
# Observations  223  213  234  137  269  208
Interaction  with Per Capita GDP
In(Per Capita GDP)  1.102  0.092  0.991  0.126  1.066  0.076  *  1.013  0.082  **  1.012  0.078  **  0.969  0.084
Openness  Measure  -0.323  1.363  1.188  1.601  0.237  0.573  0.604  3.133  -0.026  0.558  -0.515  0.587
Openness  Measurex  In(Per Capita GDP)  0.030  0.146  -0.123  0.169  -0.036  0.072  -0.085  0.396  0.002  0.070  0.052  0.064
P-Ho: a1=1  0.267  0.942  0.386  0.873  0.876  0.708
P-OID  0.218  0.144  0.567  0.126  0.226  0.121
T-NOSC  -0.742  -0.816  -0.696  1.253  -0.905  -1.005
# Observations  223  213  234  137  269  208
Interaction  with Per Capita GDP and  Land
In(Per Capita GDP)  1.120  0.105  0.901  0.099  1.046  0.084  1.063  0.083  1.101  0.072  1.009  0.081
Openness  Measure  0.304  1.780  1.161  1.485  0.109  0.605  2.552  2.858  0.513  0.569  -0.574  0.607
ln(Arable  Land/Worker)  -0.090  0.031  ***  -0.086  0.023  -0.018  0.032  -0.037  0.029  -0.054  0.039  -0.038  0.025
Openness  Measure x In(Per Capita GDP)  -0.036  0.198  -0.074  0.170  -0.024  0.075  -0.378  0.385  -0.066  0.072  0.050  0.066
Openness  Measure x ln(Arable Land  Per Worker)  0.061  0.070  0.245  0.111  -0.041  0.035  -0.366  0.262  0.016  0.039  -0.023  0.031
P-Ho: a1=1  0.253  0.322  0.582  0.443  0.163  0.915
P-OID  0.030  0.062  0.267  0.082  0.208  0.095
T-NOSC  -0.755  -0.896  -1.134  0.421  -1.019  -1.492
# Observations  207  207  219  131  243  193
Notes:  All regressions  include  regional  dummies.  The  row labelled  P-Ho: x,l=1  reports  the p-value  associated  with  the test  of the null hypothesis  that x1=1  . The  row
labelled  P-OID  reports  the P-value  associated  with  the  test of overidentifying  restrictions.  The  row  labelled  T-NOSC  reports  the t-statistic  for the test  of no second-order
serial  correlation  in the  differened  residuals.  Standard  errors  are  corrected  for heteroskedasticity  and  for  the first-order  autocorrelation  induced  by first differencing
using  a standard  Newey-West  procedure.
42Table  8: Other  Determinants  of Incomes  of  the Poor
Years Primary  Social  Agricultural  Voice  Voice with
Education  Spending  Productivity  Macro Controls
Coef  Std.Err.  Coef  Std.Err.  Coef  Std.Err.  Coef  Std.Err.  Coef  Std.Err.
ln(Per  Capita  GDP)  1.067  0.088  ***  1.025  0.101  ***  0.985  0.104  ***  0.933  0.095  ***  1.117  0.098
Years Primary  Education  0.014  0.031
Government  Consumption/  -1.553  0.547  ***
GDP
Social  Spending  -0.664  0.429
/Total Public  Spending
Agricultural  Relative  0.060  0.081
Productivity
Voice  0.095  0.053  *  0.029  0.058
P-Ho:  al=l  0.448  0.803  0.886  0.480  0.233
P-OID  0.213  0.028  0.166  0.302  0.419
T-NOSC  -0.384  0.594  -0.837  -0.970  -0.767
# Observations  222  111  197  265  207
Notes: All regressions  include  regional  dummies.  The  row  labelled  P-Ho:  a,1  reports  the p-value  associated  with the test  of the null  hypothesis  that  cXl=l.  The  row
labelled  P-OID  reports  the P-value  associated  with the  test  of overidentifying  restrictions.  The  row labelled  T-NOSC  reports  the t-statistic  for the test of no second-order
serial  correlation  in the differened  residuals.  Standard  errors  are  corrected  for  heteroskedasticity  and  for  the first-order  autocorrelation  induced  by  first differencing
using  a standard  Newey-West  procedure.
43Table 9: Variable Definitions  and Data Sources
Variable  Source  Comments
Real GDP Per  Capita  Summers  and Heston Penn  World  Constant  1985 US dollars. Extended
Tables, World Bank Data  to 1998  using constant price local
currency  growth rates. Extended  cross-
sectionally  as described  in Kraay,
Loayza,  Serven and Ventura (2000).
First Quintile Share  UN-WIDER  (2000), Deininger  and  Combination  of data  from different
Squire (1996), Ravallion  and Chen  sources  described  in text.
(2000), Lundberg  and Squire  (2000)
Gini Coefficient  UN-WIDER  (2000), Deininger  and  Combination  of data from different
Squire (1996), Ravallion  and Chen  sources  described  in text.
(2000), Lundberg  and Squire (2000)
(Exports + Imports)/GDP  World Bank Data,  Summers and  Exports and imports are in constant
Heston Penn  World Tables  1985 US dollars at market exchange
rates.  Denominator  is in constant 1985
dollars  at PPP.
Govemment  Consumption  / GDP  World Bank Data  Numerator  and denominator  are in
current local  currency units.
In(1+inflation)  World Bank Data  Inflation is CPI-based  where available,
otherwise use growth of GDP deflator.
Commercial  Bank Assets/Total  Bank  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt,  and Levine
Assets  (1999)
Rule  of Law  Kaufmann,  Kraay  and Zoido-Lobaton  Index, greater values indicate  better
(1999)  rule of law
Secondary  Education  Barro and Lee (2000)  Stock of years of secondary  education.
Frankel-Romer  Distance  Measure  Frankel  and Romer (1999)  Trade-weighted  average  of distance
from trading partners.
Population  World Bank Data
Sachs-Wamer  Index  Sachs and Wamer (1995)
Import  Taxes/Total  Imports  World Bank Data  Data on import taxes in numerator
originally  from IMF Govemment
Finance  Statistics. Numerator  and
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